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This movement spread to other areas and became known as the Sons of Iraq (SoI)
These movements coincided with a change in strategy in Iraq to focus on protecting the populace and included the deployment of 30,000 additional Soldiers to Iraq. The SoI was an essential factor in a significant drop in violence in 2007. However, the relative stability gained with the support of the SoI has not resulted in significant political reconciliation at the national level. The resultant security the SoI helped establish allowed for development and the start of political reconciliation. However, the US embrace of this predominately Sunni led effort created tension with the Government of Iraq (GoI) and in some ways undermined the government's sovereignty. This paper examines the strategic impact of the SoI movement to evaluate both the positive and negative effects as they relate to furthering US policy.
What Was US Policy?
In measuring the success of the SoI movement, we must first understand US objectives in Iraq. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq published by the Bush Administration in November 2005 defined victory in terms of short, medium and long term goals.
• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. 1 The document goes on to summarize the end state as building "a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists." Thousands were left homeless (see Figure 2 ). 27 Eventually, thirty-five tribes and sub-tribes joined the movement.
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In the end patience and discipline were the keys to turning the situation in Anbar around. CF and ISF effectively drove a wedge between al-Qaeda militants and local tribal insurgent groups. The disciplined approach by Marines and Soldiers was a stark contrast from the brutality of AQI. While CF placed much emphasis on non-lethal means to achieving security, they did not shy away from lethal combat and demonstrated the ability to kill anyone who threatened the security they were trying to establish. As Sunni leadership realized that CF offered the best route to achieve their long term interests, they took advantage of that opportunity. As CF worked with their new allies, however, they had to balance the relationship with support for elected government leaders. The movement quickly spread throughout Baghdad and surrounding areas.
Commanders at all levels demonstrated initiative and flexibility in working with local leaders to establish a cooperative framework to establish security. However, proximity to the seat of power of the Iraqi government complicated the movement in Baghdad.
Commanders had to take this into account as they organized these groups. Also, while the movement in Anbar was based upon the tribal networks, the movement in Baghdad reflected an urban mosaic where tribal ties were weakened and professional relationships, particularly through military and school ties, were more important. As a result, one of the key differences of the SoI from the Anbar Awakening was that while still primarily a Sunni dominated movement, Shia were a part of most of the groups in Baghdad. 37 Eventually, the movement grew to over 99,000 SoIs to include 29,177 in
Baghdad by August 2008, just before their transition to full Iraqi control. 38 Initially, CF maintained control of these forces through security contracts to protect key infrastructure. However, over time CF transitioned greater responsibility to the GoI with the ISF assuming command and control even though CF still paid the contracts. 39 In
October 2008, the GoI assumed full control of the SoI to include payments. 40 Embracing these local volunteers was a risky venture from the start. The risk of establishing multiple armed groups while the overall objective was to stand down sectarian militias was not lost on US leadership. Local leaders could potentially retain control of SoI groups and pose a threat to the government. 41 
Improvements in Security
While the security gained may allow US forces to begin to withdraw, establishing rival militias was clearly a departure from the President's vision and would not achieve policy objectives.
By late summer 2007 violence was clearly dropping in Iraq. As stated earlier, multiple factors led to this drop in violence. 42 In testimony before Congress, General
Petraeus cited improvements in Iraqi Security Forces and their taking on more responsibility for operations. However, he gave the greatest credit to the emergence of the "tribes and local citizens" who rejected Al Qaeda and other extremists. 43 The biggest and most obvious impact of the SoI movement was the security it helped establish within Baghdad and other areas to which it spread. In area after area, recorded violence dropped precipitously wherever SoI groups stood up. The SoI allowed CF to target more effectively by providing accurate and timely intelligence on AQI operations and structure. The ability to get detailed human intelligence (HUMINT) made targeting much more effective. 44 Also, since some of the SoI were former members of insurgent groups, their incorporation into the security framework not only increased the number of counterinsurgents, it also worked to reduce the number of insurgents. 45 The surge in US forces and adjustment of tactics to get out into the community was designed to increase the protection of the population but was still not sufficient to provide adequate protection. The SoI brought not only the manpower necessary to "hold" the terrain, but also the trust of the local populace. By bringing these forces into the security framework CF and ISF finally had the numbers of personnel needed to 'hold' these communities once they were cleared. However, effective clearing did not come from large operations conducted by security forces. Instead the most effective clearing came from detailed intelligence provided by the SoI and focused raids based on this intelligence by either conventional or special forces. The level of intelligence necessary to conduct this type of clearing was not available until the locals themselves came forward to provide the information. The SoI was more than a movement to provide security. It was also politically sensitive from its inception. While the SoI helped to undermine the insurgency, it also threatened political institutions that had already emerged within the new Iraqi polity.
Embracing this movement marked a clear change in MNF-I policy by establishing formations outside official security forces. With this change came considerable benefits.
The establishment of security enabled economic development, improvements in infrastructure, and some level of reconciliation, especially at the local level. However, it also came with significant risks to the relationship between CF and the GoI that was played out at both the local and national levels. In September 2008, the GoI moved to exert even more control over the movement by announcing that it would assume full control for the SoI as of October
2008
. 64 In a press conference, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir claimed the SoI for the government as "our sons, our citizens", but he also provided a warning that all Iraqis came under the law and that while assuming control of the SoI, the government might arrest or detain some of its members. In reality the transfer to full Iraqi control was not control. The policy objective for this strategy was "an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self reliant." 69 The President went on to say that to achieve this goal the US will "work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists." 70 However, he was perfectly clear that the US would not continue to commit its blood and treasure to achieve these outcomes. Instead he placed the responsibility on the Iraqi people to "choose a better future" and take advantage of the security that US forces helped to secure. 71 Absent was any reference to establishing a constitutional democracy within Iraq.
Instead the speech reflected a pragmatic assessment of the situation and an understanding of the limits of American power. However, as the US withdraws its forces and focus away from Iraq it is also losing influence on the ability to shape the political framework. This approach could force Iraqi's to take the lead in developing a stable government that balances the interests and concerns of the various ethnic and sectarian factions. However, the continued targeting and marginalization of Sunni leaders point to the consolidation of power of an Iraqi government that is only marginally representative of the people.
Undoubtedly Iraq has made significant progress since the winter of [2006] [2007] when it appeared that a full-scale civil war would engulf the country. The security situation has improved dramatically with violent attacks down in almost every category (see Figure 3) . According a recent Department of Defense report to Congress on the progress of the war in Iraq, violent acts are at the lowest levels they have been in five years. 72 The report states that AQI is severely degraded and many of the Shia militias have transitioned from violence to political activity. However, the report continues to stress that security gains are fragile with several Sunni and Shia groups still actively conducting operations against US and Iraqi forces. AQI, while degraded, continues to possess the capability to conduct spectacular attacks. However, gains in these two tracks remain marginal at best and depend on maintaining security. According to the DoD report to Congress "Iraq remains fragile primarily because many of the underlying sources of instability have yet to be resolved, putting security gains at risk." 77 
Conclusion
The SoI were necessary to create the current security conditions in Iraq. These security conditions were necessary to give political leaders breathing space to seek political accommodation and reconciliation. While embracing the SoI gave CF leaders leverage to push the GoI towards accommodation that leverage has waned as the US draws down its forces. Ironically and perhaps counter-intuitively, the movement has helped increase Prime Minister Maliki's consolidation of power. The SoI were essential to defeat of al-Qaeda which was the greatest source of instability within the country. 21 Author's personal observation. In February 2007, local Sunni leadership in the Khadra Neighborhood Advisory Council complained of the inability to get allotted food rations from the government food warehouse which was just a few miles away in the neighborhood of Washash. These leaders described the attack on a truck driver who was killed visiting this warehouse and showed a picture of him after he was killed. 1-5 CAV leadership visited the warehouse which was flying Shia banners even though it was a government facility. One could tell which sect controlled an area of Baghdad by whether they flew these banners or not. The manager of the warehouse claimed he was Sunni and promised to take the banners down. He agreed to provide the food, but had no way of ensuring the safety of the truck to and from the warehouse. 1-5 CAV eventually arranged for the Iraqi Army to escort trucks to the warehouse in order to get food shipments to the Sunni areas. Pinkerton, commanding 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, took over his sector just to the west of Baghdad which included the village of Abu Ghraib. In this area he inherited a homegrown security network from the previous battalion in which small villages defended themselves from al-Qaeda. Pinkerton developed procedures to reinforce these villages with his Quick Reaction Force (QRF) if insurgents attacked a village. As they gained more security, his unit found that other villages were doing the same since there were no ISF in the area. LTG Lamb then introduced a local Iraqi named Abu Azzam to Pinkerton. Abu Azzam, admitted to fighting as an insurgent, but later participated in the first tribal uprisings in Anbar. He asked Lamb's help in getting Al-Qaeda out of his home village near Abu Ghraib. In April, Pinkerton asked for Abu Azzam's help in recruiting for the local police force in the area. The response was astonishing. About a week later Pinkerton drove out to a school to about 800 local Iraqi's willing to volunteer. Pinkerton emphasized the importance of Abu Azzam's influence in getting the local populace to turn against al-Qaeda and join the security forces and to get the local government to reestablish itself. He also points to the importance of an influential Shia sheik who asked to establish checkpoints to "prevent AQI from entering the area, prevent sectarian strife, and reunite the communities."Pinkerton cited a mix of three primary drivers for the start of the Sahwa movement in his area: "1) small villages defending their self upon arrival, 54 COL James Nickolas, e-mail message to author, November 20, 2009. COL Nickolas states that the success of the Ghazliyah Guardians (GG) caused friction with the Iraqi Army, especially as the GG claimed they brought security to the neighborhood. The VIP visits with accompanying media coverage further embarrassed IA senior leadership who stated they were "uninformed" about the program. Author's experience. IA leadership purposely attempted to undermine the program during a VIP visit to Ameriyah. LTG Odierno brought several senior members of the GoI to Ameriyah to discuss reconciliation and the integration of the SoI with CF and the ISF. An IA major briefed that there was no coordination done between the local SoI and the ISF. He failed to mention the numerous meetings conducted each week where the IA battalion commander, US battalion commander, and local SoI leader met to discuss issues and plan for future operations. 55 
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